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____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
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2 
 
_____________ 
 
 
RAVI SATTIRAJU, ESQ. [ARGUED] 
The Sattiraju Law Firm 
116 Village Boulevard 
Princeton, NJ  08540  
 Counsel for Appellant  
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Ina M. Collins, who worked as a 
beauty consultant in New Jersey for Defendant-Appellee Mary 
Kay, Inc. brought this putative class action in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, claiming that 
certain Mary Kay policies and practices violated the New 
Jersey Wage Payment Law (“NJWPL”).  Mary Kay moved to 
dismiss the suit on forum non conveniens grounds, relying on 
two written agreements that set forth terms and conditions of 
the parties’ relationship.  Both agreements contained forum 
3 
 
selection clauses specifying that legal claims would be 
submitted to Texas state court.  Both also contained choice-of-
law clauses stating that Texas law would apply.   
 
 The District Court relied on federal common law in 
reaching its decision to grant Mary Kay’s motion.  On appeal, 
Collins argues that New Jersey law should govern the analysis.  
This case thus poses a layered choice-of-law question: what 
law governs the interpretation of a forum selection clause in a 
written agreement when that agreement also contains a choice-
of-law clause?  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that 
Texas law applies to the interpretation of the forum selection 
clause, and under Texas law, Collins’ claim belongs in Texas 
state court.  Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of this action on forum non conveniens grounds. 
 
I 
 Mary Kay is a Texas-based company that sells 
cosmetics to customers via beauty consultants.  Collins is a 
New Jersey resident who worked as a Mary Kay beauty 
consultant in New Jersey in a few capacities, including 
“Independent Sales Consultant” and “Independent Sales 
Director.”  App. 27 ¶ 7.  The putative class consists of 
individuals who are New Jersey residents and have worked as 
Mary Kay beauty consultants, in a variety of titles, from 
September 2009 to the present.     
 
 Collins and Mary Kay entered into two written 
agreements (collectively, “Agreements”) that set forth the 
general terms and conditions of their relationship: an 
“Independent Beauty Consultant Agreement” and an 
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“Independent Sales Director Agreement.”1  App. 15-25.  The 
Agreements contained substantively identical forum selection 
clauses: 
 
The parties further agree that if any 
dispute or controversy arises 
between them concerning any 
matter relating to this Agreement 
that any issues which either party 
may elect to submit for legal 
jurisdiction shall be submitted to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
State of Texas and the parties agree 
that the proper venue shall be 
Dallas, Dallas County, Texas. 
 
App. 16; see also App. 23.    
In addition to the forum selection clauses included in 
the Agreements, each contained a choice-of-law clause that 
specified Texas law would apply to disputes.  In the 
“Independent Beauty Consultant Agreement,” the choice-of-
law clause states, “This Agreement shall be governed by the 
laws of the State of Texas as to all matters.”  App. 16.  The 
choice-of-law clause in the Independent Sales Director 
Agreement differs only slightly, stating the “Agreement . . . 
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Texas as to all 
matters, including but not limited to matters of validity, 
                                              
 1 There is no dispute between the parties regarding the 
applicability of these agreements during the relevant time 
period.   
5 
 
construction, effect and performance.”  App. 23. 
  
Collins filed her putative class action complaint in 
September 2015 in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, invoking the court’s diversity 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  The complaint 
contained one count, a violation of the NJWPL, N.J. Stat. 
34:11-4.1, et seq.  Collins alleged in her complaint that Mary 
Kay misclassified her and the putative class members as 
independent contractors, rather than employees, under the 
standards of the NJWPL.  Collins further alleged that Mary 
Kay unlawfully required consultants to divert wages by 
mandating that they purchase Mary Kay marketing materials, 
uniforms, and a minimum quota of products in order to 
maintain their titles as consultants.  These practices, according 
to Collins, violated the NJWPL.   
  
In November 2015, Mary Kay moved to dismiss 
Collins’ complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and on forum non conveniens 
grounds.  In support of its forum non conveniens argument, 
Mary Kay pointed to the forum selection clauses included in 
the Agreements and contended that the only proper forum for 
Collins’ claim was Texas state court.  In June 2016, the District 
Court granted Mary Kay’s motion and dismissed the complaint 
on forum non conveniens grounds, finding that Texas was the 
appropriate forum under the terms of the forum selection 
clause.  This appeal followed.   
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II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction over the final 
order of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
  
The standard of review that we must apply to a district 
court’s dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is unsettled 
after the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Atlantic Marine 
Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court for the Western Dist. 
of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013), as several circuit courts have 
recognized in recent opinions.  See, e.g., Weber v. PACT XPP 
Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 766-68 (5th Cir. 2016); Martinez v. 
Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2014).  Atlantic 
Marine clarified that forum non conveniens is the proper 
mechanism for enforcing a forum selection clause that points 
to a state or foreign forum.  Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580.  
Atlantic Marine did not address, however, what standard of 
review an appellate court should use when considering a 
district court’s forum non conveniens dismissal.  Nevertheless, 
we need not resolve that issue here, because even under the 
least deferential de novo standard, the District Court’s decision 
to dismiss this case on forum non conveniens grounds must be 
affirmed. 
 
III 
A 
 Collins centers her appeal on the proper interpretation 
of the Agreements’ forum selection clauses.  Specifically, she 
argued in her opening brief that we should reverse the District 
Court’s dismissal because her claim is outside the scope of the 
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forum selection clause included in the Agreements.2  A court 
considering the interpretation of a forum selection clause 
applies principles of contract law to determine the scope of the 
clause.  See John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 
F.3d 1070, 1073 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that “[t]he question of 
the scope of a forum selection clause is one of contract 
interpretation”).  In other words, it decides “whether the claims 
and parties involved in the suit are subject” to the clause.  
Martinez, 740 F.3d at 217 (quoting Phillips v. Audio Active 
Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 
 The interpretation of a forum selection clause is an 
analytically distinct concept from the enforceability of that 
clause.  Weber, 811 F.3d at 770; see also Martinez, 740 F.3d at 
217.  A court examining the enforceability of a clause 
considers whether compelling compliance with the clause is 
“‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”  Foster v. 
Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1219 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 
(1972)); Weber, 811 F.3d at 773-75; see also Martinez, 740 
                                              
 
2 Plaintiff reiterated in her reply brief and at oral 
argument that her focus was on the scope of the clause, not its 
enforceability. Appellant’s Reply Br. 1 (summarizing her 
argument as “[Collins’s] statutory employment claim under the 
[NJWPL] is not within the scope of the forum selection clause 
. . . on which the District Court based the dismissal”); Oral Arg. 
at 1:20 (explaining “what we’re arguing is that . . . this statutory 
matter falls outside the scope of the forum selection clause”).  
Likewise, in her briefing before the District Court in opposition 
to Mary Kay’s motion to dismiss, Collins focused on the scope 
of the clause, not its enforceability.   
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F.3d at 217-19.  Collins has not raised as an issue in this appeal 
the enforceability of the Agreements’ forum selection clauses.  
Collins does not suggest, for instance, that Mary Kay “obtained 
[her] accession to the forum clause by fraud or overreaching.”  
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991); 
accord M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15; Foster, 933 F.2d at 1219.  
Nor does she argue that litigating her wage claim in Texas “will 
be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [s]he will for all 
practical purposes be deprived of h[er] day in court.”  M/S 
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18.  And she has not outlined how 
enforcement of the forum selection clauses would “contravene 
a strong public policy” of New Jersey.  Id. at 15.   
 
 Our review focuses accordingly on the clauses’ scope. 
 
B 
 Before we can determine the scope of the forum 
selection clauses in the Agreements, we must establish what 
body of law should govern our interpretation.  Under the 
familiar doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 
78 (1938), federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply 
state law to substantive issues and federal law to procedural 
issues.  Here, the District Court applied federal law to its entire 
analysis, reasoning that questions of venue are procedural 
rather than substantive in nature.  But in selecting this body of 
law, the District Court did not draw any distinction between 
questions of the clauses’ enforceability and questions of 
interpretation.     
  
Applying federal law to questions of enforceability of 
forum selection clauses comports with settled law in this 
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Circuit.3  Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  Doing so “ensure[s] that federal courts account for 
both the important interests served by forum selection clauses 
and the strong public policies that might require federal courts 
to override such clauses.”  Martinez, 740 F.3d at 220.  Further, 
it “accords with the traditional divide between procedural and 
substantive rules developed under Erie.”  Id. at 221.  The same 
cannot be said for interpretation questions, however. 
 
  Issues of contract interpretation are considered 
“quintessentially substantive,” rather than procedural, under 
Erie.  Id.; cf. Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 206, 212 
(3d Cir. 1994) (the “interpretation of a private contract is 
generally thought to be a question of state law,” rather than 
federal common law).4  Therefore, as a general rule in diversity 
                                              
 
3 The majority of our sister circuits also apply federal 
law when deciding whether to enforce a forum selection 
clause.  See Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 
643, 651 (4th Cir. 2010); Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 
821, 826-28 (6th Cir. 2009); Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. 
Controlled Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527, 538 (8th Cir. 2009); Ginter 
ex rel. Ballard v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 
439, 441 (5th Cir. 2008); Phillips, 494 F.3d at 384; P & S Bus. 
Machs., Inc. v. Canon USA, Inc., 331 F.3d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 
2003); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 
513 (9th Cir. 1988); 14D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3803.1 n.105 
(collecting cases). 
 
 
4  See also In re County of Orange, 784 F.3d 520, 530 
(9th Cir. 2015) (“[R]ules of contract interpretation and 
construction are plainly substantive under Erie.”); Eaton v. 
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cases, courts should apply state contract law to decide 
interpretation questions.  Courts may deviate from this general 
rule and apply federal common law to contract interpretation 
questions only in certain “‘restricted’ areas,” including where 
there are “uniquely federal interests” at stake, and where 
Congress has delegated power to the federal courts to develop 
substantive law on a particular subject.  Martinez, 740 F.3d at 
221-22 (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 
451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)); Miree v. DeKalb Cty., 433 U.S. 25, 
29-31 (1977); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651-52 
(1963).  Here, the Agreements at issue – contracts between two 
purely private parties that set forth the terms and conditions of 
their relationship and do not implicate any federal interests – 
most certainly fall outside of these “restricted areas.” 
 
 The Second and Fifth Circuits, in recent opinions, 
explored the question of whether federal common law should 
apply to forum selection clause interpretation, as is the practice 
for questions of enforceability.  Weber, 811 F.3d at 770-71; 
Martinez, 740 F.3d at 222-25.  Both concluded that federal law 
should not apply.  Weber, 811 F.3d at 770-71; Martinez, 740 
                                              
Penn-America Ins. Co., 626 F.3d 113, 114 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(noting that state law “supplie[d] the substantive rules of 
decision . . . relating to interpretation of the insurance 
[agreement]” at issue); Coplay Cement Co. v. Willis & Paul 
Grp., 983 F.2d 1435, 1438 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that 
rules of contract interpretation are “considered substantive 
under the Erie doctrine . . . because . . . they are concerned 
primarily with the channeling of behavior outside the 
courtroom . . . rather than with the allocation of responsibilities 
among judicial decision-makers” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)). 
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F.3d at 224.  Although it was not a diversity case, the Second 
Circuit nevertheless explained in Martinez why applying 
federal common law to interpret a forum selection clause 
frustrates the principles of Erie.  “[C]onstruing a forum 
selection clause,” the court reasoned, may involve “a wide 
range of contract law issues, from the treatment of ambiguous 
phrases . . . to the admissibility of parol evidence . . . to 
successorship and the rights of third-party beneficiaries.”  
Martinez, 740 F.3d at 221 (citations omitted).  Applying 
federal common law to these issues would “generate a 
sprawling ‘federal general common law’ of contracts,” which 
the Supreme Court in Erie advised courts to avoid.  Id.  
Applying state contract law to these issues eliminates this Erie 
problem. 
 
 Our precedent stands in harmony with this approach.  In 
Jumara v. State Farm Insurance Co., we stated broadly that 
“[b]ecause ‘[q]uestions of venue and the enforcement of forum 
selection clauses are essentially procedural, rather than 
substantive, in nature,’ . . . federal law applies in diversity 
cases.”  Jumara, 55 F.3d at 877 (quoting Jones v. Weibrecht, 
901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added)).  But our 
analysis in Jumara focused on the enforceability of the forum 
selection clause.  Id.  Further, the Second Circuit’s opinion in 
Jones, upon which we relied in Jumara, dealt exclusively with 
enforceability.  To the extent we addressed clause 
interpretation in Jumara, we did not explicitly note what body 
of law applied, and we cited sparingly in our interpretation 
discussion to both state and federal law.  Id. at 880-82.   
 
 Unlike Jumara, our subsequent decision in John Wyeth 
& Brother Ltd. v. CIGNA International Corp. focused on 
forum selection clause interpretation.  119 F.3d at 1073-74.   
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But because the parties did not appear to dispute which body 
of law governed the interpretation, we simply applied “general 
contract law principles” to determine that the clause 
encompassed the plaintiff’s claim.  Id. at 1074.  More recently, 
in Carlyle Investment Management LLC v. Moonmouth Co. SA, 
779 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 2015), we referenced both Delaware 
state law and federal law when interpreting the scope of the 
forum selection clause at issue, without explicitly addressing 
which law controlled.  Id. at 220-21.   
 
 In sum, we find no reason under this Circuit’s precedent 
or the Erie doctrine to apply federal common law to interpret 
the forum selection clauses in the Agreements here.  
Accordingly, we will apply state contract law to assess the 
scope of the clauses and decide whether they encompass 
Collins’ NJWPL claim. 
 
C 
1 
 Having established that state contract law, rather than 
federal common law, governs the interpretation of the forum 
selection clauses here, we must now determine which state’s 
contract law applies.  In diversity cases such as this one, we 
look to the choice-of-law rules of the forum state – the state in 
which the District Court sits – in order to decide which body 
of substantive law to apply to a contract provision, even where 
the contract contains a choice-of-law clause.  See Klaxon Co. 
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding 
that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-
of-law rules of the forum state); Kruzits v. Okuma Mach. Tool, 
Inc., 40 F.3d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Pennsylvania’s 
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choice-of-law rules in diversity case, despite the presence of 
choice-of-law clause selecting Illinois law, and concluding that 
Illinois law governs interpretation of indemnity clause of a 
lease agreement); see also Weber, 811 F.3d at 770-71 
(explaining that “the presence or absence of a specific choice-
of-law clause does not alter the core obligation of a federal 
court, sitting in diversity, to ascertain which body of 
substantive law to apply by implementing the choice-of-law 
rules of its home jurisdiction”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. 
Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 822 F.3d 620, 641 (2d Cir. 2016); 
H & R Block Tax Servs. LLC v. Franklin, 691 F.3d 941, 943 
(8th Cir. 2012); Hitachi Credit Am. Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 
F.3d 614, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1999); Kohler v. Leslie Hindman, 
Inc., 80 F.3d 1181, 1184-85 (7th Cir. 1996).5   
 
 We thus turn to New Jersey choice-of-law rules to 
determine what state’s substantive contract law governs the 
interpretation of the Agreements’ forum selection clauses, 
since this diversity action originated in a New Jersey federal 
district court.  New Jersey choice-of-law rules provide that 
“[o]rdinarily, when parties to a contract have agreed to be 
governed by the laws of a particular state, New Jersey courts 
will uphold the contractual choice.”  Instructional Sys., Inc. v. 
Comput. Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 133 (N.J. 1992) 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 187 (Am. 
                                              
 5 In Martinez, the Second Circuit held that the law 
selected in the relevant agreement’s choice-of-law clause 
applied to interpret the forum selection clause, without 
conducting a choice-of-law analysis.  Martinez, 740 F.3d at 
220.  But Martinez was not a diversity case; it was a federal 
question case in which the relevant agreement invoked 
international law.   
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Law Inst. 1969) (“Restatement”)).  This rule honoring the 
parties’ selected law serves the “[p]rime objectives of contract 
law . . . to protect the justified expectations of the parties and 
to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy what will 
be their rights and liabilities under the contract.”  Restatement 
§ 187 cmt. e.  Eliminating uncertainties about which law 
governs may be particularly critical where, as here, the parties 
reside in and perform their contractual obligations in different 
jurisdictions.  A court should not depart from this rule and 
“refrain from applying the [parties’] chosen law merely 
because this would lead to a different result than would be 
obtained under the . . . law” of the forum state.  Id. § 187 cmt. 
g.  
  
 Parties’ freedom to choose the law applicable to their 
agreements is not without boundaries in New Jersey law.  New 
Jersey looks to Restatement § 187 to determine under what 
circumstances a choice-of-law clause will not be respected.  
Instructional Sys., 614 A.2d at 133.  Specifically, the 
Restatement provides that the parties’ contractual choice will 
not govern if:  
 
(a) the chosen state has no 
substantial relationship to the 
parties or the transaction and there 
is no other reasonable basis for the 
parties’ choice, or (b) application 
of the law of the chosen state 
would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of a state 
which has a materially greater 
interest than the chosen state in the 
determination of the particular 
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issue and which . . . would be the 
state of the applicable law in the 
absence of an effective choice of 
law by the parties.  
 
Id. (quoting Restatement § 187(2)).  In essence then, the law 
specified in the Agreements – Texas law – should control the 
interpretation of the forum selection clause unless the choice-
of-law clause itself is unenforceable in this context.   
 
 Collins has not demonstrated that either of the two 
exceptions outlined in Restatement § 187(2) should apply.  
There is no dispute that the parties have a substantial 
relationship to the state of Texas.6  Further, Collins has not 
shown why New Jersey has a “materially greater interest” in 
the application of its own contract law to the interpretation of 
the forum selection clauses, or how the application of Texas 
contract law to interpret the scope of the forum selection 
clauses would offend the “fundamental policy” of New Jersey.7  
                                              
 6 Any dispute by Collins on this point would have been 
unavailing, as Mary Kay is headquartered in Texas.  
Instructional Sys., 614 A.2d at 133 (finding that since one of 
the parties, a Delaware corporation, was headquartered in 
California, California law had a substantial relationship to the 
parties); see also Restatement § 187, cmt. f (noting that a 
“substantial relationship” will be found “where one of the 
parties . . . has [its] principal place of business” in the “state of 
the chosen law”).   
 
 
7 Despite the presence of the choice-of-law clauses in 
the Agreements in this case, Collins did not address Texas 
substantive law in her briefing to the District Court or in her 
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Accordingly, we will apply Texas contract law to interpret the 
scope of the forum selection clause in the Agreements. 
 
2 
 Under Texas contract law, the Agreements’ forum 
selection clauses encompass Collins’ wage claim.  As noted 
above, the forum selection clauses in the Agreements provided 
that “if any dispute or controversy arises between [the parties] 
concerning any matter relating to this Agreement,” the case 
must be filed in Texas state court.8  App. 16, 23 (emphasis 
added).  Collins argues that because her claim is not for breach 
of contract, it is not within the scope of the forum selection 
clauses.  Yet Collins concedes in her supplemental briefing that 
                                              
opening brief to this Court.  In response to this Court’s request 
for supplemental briefing on the applicability of Texas law, 
Collins again did not address whether and how the application 
of Texas law to interpret the forum selection clause would 
offend fundamental New Jersey policy.  Collins cursorily states 
in her reply brief that the Agreements’ choice-of-law clauses 
should be invalidated because they fail to include an 
unambiguous waiver of statutory claims like her NJWPL 
claim.  At this stage of the analysis, however, the “particular 
issue” of concern is not whether the choice-of-law clause 
should apply to Collins’ underlying wage claim, but whether it 
applies to the interpretation of the forum selection clause.  See 
Restatement § 187(2)(b).   
 
 
8 There is no dispute in this case that the Agreements’ 
forum selection clauses  were mandatory in effect, requiring 
parties to bring the claims in Texas state court, rather than just 
permissive.  See Phillips, 494 F.3d at 383-84. 
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courts applying Texas law “interpret forum selection clauses 
covering claims ‘relating to’ an agreement as broad in scope.”  
Appellant’s Supp. Br. 4; see also In re Longoria, 470 S.W.3d 
616, 628 (Tex. App. 2015) (collecting relevant cases and 
noting that “courts have consistently held the language ‘any 
interpretation, dispute, or any aspect related to’ is broad”); 
RSR Corp. v. Siegmund, 309 S.W.3d 686, 701-02 (Tex. App. 
2010) (finding that where a forum selection clause covers 
claims that “relate to” an agreement, it “encompass[es] all 
claims that have some possible relationship with the 
agreement” or some “connection with” the agreement 
(citations omitted)).  Collins has not cited to authority applying 
Texas law to exclude wage claims from a forum selection 
clause of comparable breadth to the clauses here. 
 
 Indeed, courts applying Texas law have held that forum 
selection clauses with broad language, like that used in the 
Agreements, encompass a variety of non-contractual claims, 
including statutory claims.  For instance, in Barnette v. United 
Research Co., 823 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App. 1991), a Texas court 
held that a forum selection clause included within an 
employment agreement applied to claims of age 
discrimination, since the claim arose out of the employment 
relationship between the parties and implicated the terms of the 
agreements.  Id. at 369-70 (citing Crescent Int’l, Inc. v. Avatar 
Communities, Inc., 857 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1988)).  In 
Accelerated Christian Education, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 925 
S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App. 1996), overruled in part on other 
grounds, In re Tyco Elecs. Power Sys., Inc., 2005 WL 237232, 
at *4 & n.1 (Tex. App. 2005), another Texas court held that the 
plaintiff’s claim for violation of state consumer protection 
statutes, among others, was within the scope of a forum 
selection clause that, by its terms, encompassed claims 
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“relating to” software licensing and service agreements.  Id. at 
71-72.  Likewise, in Young v. Valt.X Holdings, Inc., 336 
S.W.3d 258 (Tex. App. 2010), a court held that the forum 
selection clause covering claims “arising under or relating to” 
a stock purchase agreement applied to claims for violations of 
the state securities act and state consumer protection law.  Id. 
at 263.   
 
 By contrast, in Busse v. Pacific Cattle Feeding Fund #1, 
Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App. 1995), the court held that the 
forum selection clause in the agreement did not encompass the 
plaintiff’s tort claim for fraudulent inducement.  Id. at 812-13.  
The clause language in Busse differed from that in Accelerated 
and Young; it stated that it applied only to the “agreement and 
the rights and obligations of the parties arising hereto.”  Id. at 
812-13.  Thus, the court’s narrow interpretation of the clause 
in Busse to exclude the plaintiff’s tort claim could be explained 
by the specific language chosen by the parties that limited its 
application to claims arising under the contract itself.  See id.  
In sum, the applicability of a forum selection clause to a 
plaintiff’s statutory claims “d[oes] not turn on the presence of 
contractual claims,” but rather turns on “the language of the 
particular forum selection clause to which the parties agreed.”  
Robbins & Myers, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 2002 WL 418206, 
at *2 (Tex. App. 2002). 
 
 Like the age discrimination claim in Barnette, Collins’ 
wage claim “relates to” her working relationship with Mary 
Kay and thus implicates the contents of the Agreements.  The 
Agreements establish the relationship between Collins and 
Mary Kay and outline its terms and conditions.  While the 
Agreements themselves are not determinative of whether 
Collins qualifies as an “employee” afforded wage law 
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protection or an unprotected “independent contractor,” the 
Agreements will be relevant to understanding the contours of 
the parties’ affiliation.  Further, the Agreements touch on 
consultants’ purchases from the company, a key issue in 
Collins’ sole claim: that Mary Kay mandated certain prohibited 
payments from its beauty consultants.  In the absence of 
authority suggesting that Texas law would interpret this broad 
forum selection clause to exclude Collins’ wage claim, we hold 
her claim falls within its scope. 
 
D 
 Having concluded that Collins’s claim falls within the 
scope of the Agreements’ enforceable forum selection clauses, 
we turn finally to the District Court’s application of the forum 
non conveniens framework, as modified by the Supreme Court 
in Atlantic Marine.  As the District Court outlined, in this 
Circuit, four factors normally guide a district court’s 
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the 
absence of a forum selection clause:  
 
(1) the amount of deference to be 
afforded to plaintiffs’ choice of 
forum; (2) the availability of an 
adequate alternative forum where 
defendants are amenable to 
process and plaintiffs’ claims are 
cognizable; (3) relevant ‘private 
interest’ factors affecting the 
convenience of the litigants; and 
(4) relevant ‘public interest’ 
factors affecting the convenience 
of the forum.   
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Kisano Trade & Invest Ltd. v. Lemster, 737 F.3d 869, 873 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (quoting Windt v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 529 
F.3d 183, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2008)).  Atlantic Marine instructs 
that a forum selection clause alters this analysis in several 
ways.  Relevant here, a plaintiff’s choice of forum in filing his 
or her lawsuit “merits no weight,” and we are not to consider 
any arguments about the parties’ private interests – those 
“weigh entirely in favor of the preselected [Texas] forum.”  
Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581-82.  So then, all we are to 
consider are the second and fourth factors, which Atlantic 
Marine advises will overcome a forum selection clause in only 
the most “unusual” and “extraordinary” circumstances.  Id. 
 
 Collins has not disputed the availability of another 
forum to hear her claim.  Nor has she addressed with any 
specificity the public interest factors that could favor litigation 
in New Jersey federal court over Texas state court.9  As the 
                                              
 
9 These “[p]ublic-interest factors may include ‘the 
administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the 
local interest in having localized controversies decided at 
home; [and] the interest in having the trial of a diversity case 
in a forum that is at home with the law.’”  Atlantic Marine, 134 
S. Ct. at 581 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 
235, 241 n.6 (1981)); see also In re Howmedica Osteonics 
Corp, 867 F.3d 390, 402 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e clarify that 
‘practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, 
and inexpensive’ represent a private interest, as the Supreme 
Court stated in Atlantic Marine, and as we have often stated in 
the forum non conveniens context, [] we acknowledge judicial 
economy considerations to be a distinct, cognizable public 
interest.” (citations omitted)). 
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party resisting the application of a forum selection clause, 
Collins bears a heavy burden under Atlantic Marine.  Id. at 582.  
She has failed to carry that burden in this case.  Therefore, the 
District Court correctly granted Mary Kay’s motion and 
dismissed this action on forum non conveniens grounds. 
 
 We are mindful of the predicament that could arise for 
a plaintiff who (a) performs work in her home state for a 
company headquartered in another state, (b) seeks the 
substantive protections guaranteed by her home state’s wage 
payment law; and (c) is subject to forum selection and choice-
of-law clauses in her employment agreement that point outside 
of her home state.  But it is incumbent on plaintiffs in those 
situations to challenge the enforceability of the forum selection 
clauses and to outline for the lower court exactly how they 
stand to be deprived of the wage payment protections they are 
otherwise guaranteed.  Collins made no attempt to do so in this 
case.   
 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision 
of the District Court to dismiss this action on forum non 
conveniens grounds. 
